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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research in international economics points at the likely relevance of bar-
riers to trade other than tariffs and quotas. Rauch (2001) focuses on the impor-
tance of information costs that are related to physical (and cultural) distances.
Deardorff (2001) argues that international trade patterns to a large extent de-
pend on largely unobservable trading costs, instead of factor endowments and
technology. On the same note, Anderson (2001) states that informal trade bar-
riers appear to be very large even between similar countries, such as the US and
Canada. Thus, informal trade barriers may help explain the home bias or border
effect in trade (McCallum 1995). Also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) highlight
the possible role of unobserved trade costs in sorting out some of the apparent
puzzles in international economics.
The unobserved barriers to trade are often related to incomplete or asymmet-
ric information and uncertainty in exchange. North (1990, 1995) argues that,
because of imperfect insight and incomplete information, people form institu-
tions. He defines institutions as ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction’ (1990, p. 3). These rules of the game are intended to reduce the un-
certainty in exchange, and lower transaction costs. The impact of institutions on
transaction costs has received a lot of attention in the literature on economic
growth and development (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999, Olson 1996, Knack and
Keefer 1995). This literature builds on the notion that poor governance entails
negative externalities for private transactions, and consequently raises transac-
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tion costs with negative effects on growth and development. We can neatly ex-
tend these arguments to international trade (see Wei 2000). Because interna-
tional transactions involve multiple governance systems, the effectiveness of
domestic institutions in securing and enforcing property rights in economic ex-
change is an important determinant of trade costs. Furthermore, formal rules af-
fect informal norms of behaviour and inter-personal trust, which influence the
mores and conventions of doing business. These, in turn, may also impact on
risk perceptions and preferences in international transactions. We therefore in-
vestigate the hypothesis that institutions matter for international trade1.
In order to identify the effects of institutions on bilateral trade, we estimate
gravity equations. The ‘gravity model’ of bilateral trade is inspired by Newton’s
equation of gravity in physics, which relates the gravity force with which two
bodies attract each other proportionately to the product of their masses, and in-
versely to the square of their distance. Interpreting trade between two countries
as the economic analogue of the mutual gravitational force between two bodies,
with their respective GDPs reflecting mass, we see the intuitive rationale for a
gravity model of bilateral trade2. In general, the gravity model considers trade
between a pair of countries as an increasing function of their national incomes
and a decreasing function of their geographical distance (Frankel and Rose
2002). Other variables that relate to both countries, or either of the two coun-
tries separately, may also enter into the equation (population size, land area,
contiguity, etc.). The model has performed well empirically. Amongst others,
studies by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998) show that both
new trade theories of product differentiation as well as the classical Heckscher-
Ohlin theory of comparative advantage can provide a theoretical rationale for
the gravity model of bilateral trade.
Compared to the literature on institutions and growth, the impact of institu-
tions on international trade flows has received relatively little attention3. Two
1. Evidently, the growth and trade lines of research are closely related. Many studies have identi-
fied openness to international trade as an important determinant of economic growth (e.g., Fran-
kel and Romer 1999). Thus, even if institutions are shown to be of less direct importance for
economic performance than trade (cf. Dollar and Kraay 2002), a strong link between the quality
of governance and trade reconfirms the importance of good governance for long-run economic
performance. See, for example, Frankel and Rose (2002) who use a gravity model approach to
argue that the main benefits of a currency union for economic performance are related to its pos-
itive effect on trade and openness, which affect performance beneficially.
2. The analogy doesn’t entirely follow suit. While the resulting force with which either of the two
particles attracts the other is equal (irrespective of their individual mass), trade from one country
to the other may in general be different from its counterpart.
3. Anderson (2001) and Den Butter and Mosch (2002) are examples in the literature that focus on
the effects of informal institutions on trade.
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recent empirical studies have considered the impact of institutions on trade in
a gravity model context (Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, Koukhartchouk and
Maurel 2003). Anderson and Marcouiller have been amongst the main contrib-
utors to extend institutional analysis of the economy explicitly to the field of in-
ternational trade. Their most recent contribution combines the analysis of the
effects of institutions in a theoretical model with empirical estimates of the im-
pact of institutional effectiveness on trade. Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003)
analyse the effects of joining international institutions such as the WTO and the
EU on trade patterns. They introduce variables reflecting institutional quality
into the analysis of potential trade effects for Central and Eastern European
countries.
Our paper intends to contribute to this virgin literature in two ways. First, we
have used the most recent and comprehensive data-set on the quality of govern-
ance available. This database was constructed for the World Bank by Kaufmann
et al. (2002). Indicators from 17 different sources, constructed by 15 organisa-
tions have been combined, including the sources used by Anderson and Mar-
couiller (World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report) and
Koukhartchouk and Maurel (Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom Index).
Second, we intend to analyse not only the effect of institutional quality on trade,
but also the effect of similarity in governance quality. In this way, we capture
both the country-specific effect of good governance on trade, and the bilateral
influence of institutional distance on patterns of trade. We expect that institu-
tional homogeneity results in similar, hence familiar, informal business proce-
dures, which may reduce transaction costs.
We proceed as follows. Section II discusses the measures of institutional
quality that we have used in the analysis. In sections III and IV, we present and
discuss the regression results for alternative specifications of a basic and ex-
tended gravity model, respectively. Section V concludes.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MODEL SETUP
In the empirical analysis that follows, we make use of both country-specific and
bilateral data from various sources. Gross domestic product for exporting and
importing countries are examples of country-specific variables that we include
in the analysis. Geographical distance, adjacency, main language and religion,
amongst others, are examples of other characteristics that we take into account
for each pair of countries. We focus on trade patterns in 1998, for a set of more
than 100 countries. We use bilateral exports as dependent variable, such that
each country pair yields two observations, with each country either as exporter
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or importer. Since these variables are more or less standard in the literature, we
do not extensively discuss them here. Appendix A further describes these data
and their sources.
Since the main emphasis in this paper is on the effects of institutions, we
take a closer look at the institutional variables. We have used the database con-
structed by Kaufmann et al. (2002). They have constructed six indicators of
perceived institutional quality. Each indicator captures some related aspects of
the quality of governance. They either reflect the political process, the quality
of the state apparatus and its policies, or the success of governance. We discuss
these indicators in turn.
1. ‘Voice and Accountability’ reflects the extent to which citizens can partici-
pate in selecting government and hold it accountable for the actions taken.
This score includes various characteristics of the political process as well as
assessments of the independence of the media. It reflects whether citizens
and business can prevent arbitrariness in the behaviour of government and
enforce good governance when needed.
2. ‘Political Stability’ refers to the perceived likelihood of the government be-
ing destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional interference or excesses
of violence against persons and possessions. These factors are highly detri-
mental for the continuity of policy and the stability of the economic environ-
ment.
3. ‘Government Effectiveness’ is a measure for the quality of government in-
puts. It represents, amongst others, the perceived quality and independence
of the bureaucracy. This indicates the ability of government to formulate and
implement good policies.
4. ‘Regulatory Quality’ is directly focused on the quality of implemented pol-
icies. It includes the perceived incidence of policies that inhibit the market
mechanism, and excessive regulation of foreign trade and business develop-
ment, and as such closely reflects the transaction costs that result from pol-
icy intrusion by the state in private trade.
5. ‘Rule of Law’ indicates the quality of the legal system. It indicates society’s
perceived success in upholding fair and predictable rules for social and eco-
nomic interaction. Essentially, it focuses on the quality of the legal system
and the enforceability of contracts.
6. ‘Control of Corruption’ represents the extent of ‘lawless’ or unfair behav-
iour in public-private interactions. It complements regulatory quality and
rule of law indicators, pointing at the impact of bad governance on economic
interaction. Corruption, like regulatory intrusion, affects transaction costs
by adding a ‘third-party’ involvement to private transactions. An added com-
ponent of corruption to trading costs is its arbitrary, uncertain nature.
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Table 1 below illustrates the data on institutional quality. It presents the sample
means and standard deviations for each of these indicators, together with some
tentative illustration of the corresponding cross-country differences in institu-
tional quality.
Table 1
Some data on governance as illustration: countries at various levels of quality 
To capture similarity in institutional quality, we have constructed dummy vari-
ables for the various dimensions of governance that we introduced before. If the
difference in institutional effectiveness (positively defined) between two coun-
tries in a country-pair exceeds (is below) a specified fraction of the sample stan-
dard deviation of the specific indicator of effectiveness, the countries are
viewed as heterogeneous (homogeneous) in terms of the quality of governance.
In such a case, the country-pair scores a value of zero (one) on the governance
similarity dummy. The estimated effect of institutional homogeneity on trade,
measured in this way as a discrete impact, is clear and concise in its interpre-
tation4.
All aspects of governance are interrelated. As a result, the indicators are
highly positively correlated. For that reason, we treat them separately in the em-
Governance 
Quality
Voice and 
accounta-
bility
Political 
Stability
Government 
Effective-
ness
Regulatory 
Quality
Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption
One s.d. above 
mean Spain France Hong Kong Uruguay Spain Slovenia
Mean Governance Slovenia Morocco China Brunei Tanzania Jordan
One s.d. below 
mean Azerbaijan Benin Yemen Burundi Azerbaijan Tanzania
Mean
(s.d.)
0.22
(0.92)
0.15
(0.88)
0.14
(0.92)
0.18
(0.79)
0.16
(0.95)
0.09
(1.00)
Note: All indicator scores have been scaled from –2.5 to +2.5 (see Kaufmann et al. 2002). The se-
lected countries have a minimum distance to the mean and the score of one s. d. above and below 
average, respectively.
4. Alternatively, we could have specified a non-linear function of the absolute value of the differ-
ence in institutional quality. In this way, we would have an index of heterogeneity on a continu-
ous scale. The interpretation of the size of the effect would be more difficult though. To account
for the sensitivity of our dummy variable specification, we address the results for several simi-
larity criteria.
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pirical analysis, including one dimension of governance in the equation at a
time. Adding too many at once results in serious problems of multi-collinearity.
We will also use a composite indicator of institutional quality, to capture the
overall quality of governance in a country. The simple arithmetic average of the
scores on each separate indicator serves as a composite indicator that reflects
overall quality of governance.
A typical gravity equation that we estimate below looks as follows:
ln(Tij) = β0 + β1 ln(Yi) + β2 ln(Yj) + β3 ln(yi) + β4 ln(yj) 
+ β5 ln(Dij) + β6Adjij + β7Langij + β8PTAij + β9Religionij (1)
+ β10Colij + β11Insti + β12Instj + β13SimInstij + εij
where i and j denote the exporting and importing country. The dependent vari-
able Tij is aggregate merchandise exports from i to j for 1998. The independent
variables are, respectively: national income (Y), income per capita (y), the dis-
tance between i and j (Dij), dummies reflecting whether i and j share: a land bor-
der (Adj), their primary language (Lang), membership in a regional Preferen-
tial Trade Agreement (PTA), their main religion (Religion), and whether they
were part of a common colonial empire (Col). The variables of particular inter-
est in this paper are, respectively, the level of subjective institutional quality
(Inst), and a dummy reflecting whether both countries have a similar quality of
institutions (SimInst). The last term is the stochastic error term, which captures
all other (omitted) effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved. The
gravity model estimates are acquired using OLS.
III. BASIC RESULTS
Before investigating the effects of institutions, we first discuss a set of specifi-
cations of the gravity equation that take into account standard variables often
applied in the literature. The results are contained in Table 2. In the first speci-
fication, we regress bilateral trade on the levels of gross domestic product in the
exporting and importing country. This specification of the gravity model corre-
sponds to basic new trade theory models, in which trade is positively related to
market size. In accordance with other gravity model studies of bilateral trade,
we find that GDP positively and significantly affects trade. This confirms theo-
retical expectations. Since we focus on exports rather than total bilateral trade,
we can also examine whether the effect of GDP on trade differs between the
country of origin and the country of destination of trade flows. The results in-
dicate that export supply is income elastic: a 1% increase in exporter GDP
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raises bilateral trade on average by about 1.2%, while trade is inelastic with re-
spect to importer GDP, with an estimated elasticity of 0.86. The importance of
GDP variation in accounting for the variation in trade is illustrated by the fact
that about half of the variation in bilateral trade flows is explained by variation
in GDP.
Table 2
Standard gravity equations; dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
The second specification adds geographical distance as an explanatory variable
of bilateral trade. Distance serves as a proxy for the size of transportation costs
and also reflects other distance related trade costs. This specification includes
the relevant variables that feature in basic new economic geography models
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 a)
Log GDP exporter 1.19
(89.25)
1.26
(106.41)
1.20
(81.24)
1.18
(81.05)
Log GDP importer 0.86
(69.07)
0.90
(81.48)
0.86
(59.80)
0.85
(59.32)
Log GDP per capita 
exporter
0.15
(5.31)
0.20
(7.23)
Log GDP per capita 
importer
0.11
(4.03)
0.15
(5.72)
Log Distance –1.34
(–51.95)
–1.30
(–50.24)
–1.15
(–42.30)
–0.89
(–31.74)
Border Dummy 0.67
(4.80)
1.09
(8.57)
Language Dummy 0.19
(1.75)
0.58
(5.48)
Trade area Dummy 0.87
(10.19)
1.00
(11.28)
Religion Dummy 0.45
(8.39)
0.75
(14.53)
Colonial Dummy 0.68
(7.46)
0.65
(7.00)
adj. R2 0.53 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.72
number of obs. 9 554 9 554 9 006 9 006 9 652
F-statistic 5 444.81 5 554.86 3 296.67 1 782.42 –
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant 
terms, where applicable, are not shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.
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(see Fujita et al. 1999). Distance negatively affects the intensity of trade. Ac-
cording to our estimates, a 1% increase in bilateral distance reduces trade more
than proportionately. The effect of distance is highly significant. The result sup-
ports the importance of trade costs for explaining the patterns of trade. After
including the basic gravity variables (income and distance), more than 60% of
the variation in trade is accounted for.
Standard gravity models also control for other country-specific and bilateral
characteristics that may affect trade. The third model included in Table 2 allows
for an effect of the level of development on trade. Trade is estimated to increase
with the level of income per capita in both countries. These coefficients are sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level. This finding has also been reported fre-
quently in other gravity studies (e.g., Frankel 1997, 1998), but is not undis-
puted. Trade theories do not provide a clear explanation for the positive effect
of per capita income. As it is, the estimates confirm the observation by Dear-
dorff (1998, p. 16) that ‘high-income countries trade disproportionately more
(. . .) with all trading partners and not just among themselves, while low-income
countries trade less’. Adding income per capita to the gravity equation de-
creases the coefficients for the GDP variables somewhat to separate the effects
of economic size and economic development.
The fourth specification extends the model with several variables that have
proven to be effective controls for shared historical, political and cultural back-
ground (see Frankel 1997)5. The dummy variables indicate the presence of a
common language, common dominant religion and common colonial history.
Furthermore, we control for the effect of economic integration using a dummy
variable for common membership in regional trading blocs. Measurement er-
rors in the distance variable, as well as the effect of historical relations between
adjacent countries are captured by the dummy for common land border. The re-
sults show that all variables have the expected positive sign as is often reported
in the literature, and are significant at the 10% level at least.
The coefficients on GDP and income per capita are quite robust to these ex-
tensions. As expected, the estimated impact of distance on trade (positively de-
fined) declines somewhat. Most relations represented in the bilateral dummy
variables more or less cluster in space. Thus, adding these variables arguably
5. The rationale for the extended model is not so much that it increases the share of explained var-
iation in trade flows (the adjusted R2 rises only slightly). It is by no means an uncommon finding
that the proportion of the variance in trade flows explained by the gravity model does not rise
substantially after the basic gravity variables have been accounted for. The bilateral dummies in
Specification 4 correct for the effects of various unobserved trade costs on bilateral trade, that
would otherwise bias the estimates on the basic gravity variables.
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corrects for an upward omitted variables bias in the estimated impact of dis-
tance on trade.
We may still wonder whether the coefficients on the bilateral dummies them-
selves suffer from the effects of omitted country-specific variables. The results
for a regression equation that includes country-specific dummies for each
country, both as exporter and importer, are presented in the last column of
Table 2. The model is estimated with a full set of dummies, omitting one
dummy and the constant term. The dummy variables represent all country-spe-
cific factors that might be relevant for their propensity to trade, either in the role
as exporter or as importing country. The resulting parameter estimates for bi-
lateral variables generally become more precise and do not suffer from omitted
variable biases.
Following the introduction of country-specific dummies, the coefficients on
the bilateral dummy variables rise, and they become statistically more signifi-
cant. However, country-specific fixed effects lower the impact of distance and
its statistical significance. Despite the quantitative changes in the estimates, the
qualitative effects do not change in comparison to the standard gravity model
as represented in Specification 4.
IV. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS
In this section we extend the analysis in the previous section and focus on the
explanatory role of institutional quality and institutional homogeneity for the
intensity of bilateral trade. The economic rationale for including these variables
is simple. A better quality of the institutional framework reduces uncertainty
about contract enforcement and general economic governance. This reduces
transaction costs directly, by increasing the security of property, as well as in-
directly, by increasing the level of trust in the process of economic transactions.
Homogeneity in the perceived quality of institutions (cf. Beugelsdijk and Van
Schaik 2001) may give rise to similar norms of behaviour (conventions, busi-
ness practices) and similar levels of trust in doing business. Institutional homo-
geneity leads to familiarity with each other’s formal procedures and with the
informal conventions and habits developed to deal with the governance situa-
tion. If traders in both countries experience similar levels of institutional effec-
tiveness, they are better equipped to use each other’s institutions, to operate in
each other’s institutional environment. This reduces adjustment costs that have
to be made because of natural unfamiliarity with international trading partners,
and lowers the insecurity related to transaction contingencies in trade. Similar-
ity of informal business procedures may increase bilateral trust. Economic
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agents in similar institutional environments have more confidence in being
compatible trading partners, compared to the traders from two institutionally
heterogeneous countries6.
Our reasoning logically relates to the argument in Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002, pp. 343–344), who state that insecurity of international transactions in-
fluences trade by imposing a price mark-up on traded goods. This price mark-
up depends on two factors. The quality of institutions determines their effec-
tiveness in protecting and enabling private transactions. However, the bilateral
familiarity of trading partners is important as well. This determines how ‘skill-
fully’ traders can use each other’s institutional capacity. Anderson and Mar-
couiller refer to the instrumental roles that can be played in this matter by lan-
guage commonality and contiguity. They also justify the relative insecurity
mark-up on traded goods as compared to domestic goods by arguing that trans-
action costs in domestic trade are lower because of the greater availability of
informal procedures to protect property rights. We argue that institutional ho-
mogeneity is an additional factor determining relative transaction costs and
price mark-ups in bilateral trade.
4.1 The effects of institutional quality
Table 3 presents the results for a gravity model supplemented with institutional
quality. Each specification includes an indicator for the perceived quality of a
country’s institutional framework. The variable relevant for each specification
is given in the column headings. Across the board, the impact of a higher per-
ceived quality of governance on bilateral trade is positive and highly statisti-
cally significant, independent of which indicator of quality is used in the esti-
mations. Because the indicators of institutional quality vary between –2.5 to
+2.5, we cannot log-linearize the relation between institutions and trade. The
relation necessarily is of a semi-log form. The effect sizes reported are semi-
elasticities. To interpret the substantive impact suggested by these effect sizes,
we start from the standard deviation of these variables within the sample. The
effect on trade of a difference of one standard deviation from the average insti-
tutional quality gives a good indication of the average impact of variation in in-
6. Similarity of informal norms resulting from a similar experience with formal governance is an
important potential factor of cultural familiarity. Language, religion and other historical ties are
other factors that have received earlier attention in the literature. The general argument of ‘cul-
tural familiarity’, or ‘psychic distance’, goes back to Linnemann (1966) and others (cited in
Frankel 1997).
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stitutional quality on trade flows. Table 1 illustrated the sample means and
standard deviations of the indicators for institutional quality.
Table 3
Extended gravity equations: institutional quality;
dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
Voice and 
Accoun-
tability
Political 
Stability
Govern-
ment 
Effective-
ness
Regula-
tory 
Quality
Rule of 
Law
Control 
of Cor-
ruption
Compos-
ite Indi-
cator
Log GDP exporter 1.20
(82.31)
1.19
(80.21)
1.18
(80.19)
1.19
(80.41)
1.19
(80.47)
1.19
(80.57)
1.19
(80.92)
Log GDP importer 0.85
(60.03)
0.85
(57.74)
0.84
(57.65)
0.85
(57.97)
0.85
(57.67)
0.85
(57.85)
0.86
(58.19)
Log GDP per capita 
exporter
–0.05
(–1.48)
0.05
(1.32)
–0.05
(–1.18)
0.10
(2.93)
–0.06
(–1.38)
–0.04
(–0.97)
–0.09
(–2.04)
Log GDP per capita 
importer
0.07
(1.95)
0.00
(–0.06)
–0.02
(–0.55)
0.01
(0.30)
0.04
(1.07)
0.02
(0.48)
–0.05
(–1.25)
Log Distance –1.15
(–42.47)
–1.16
(–42.89)
–1.16
(–43.03)
–1.19
(–43.42)
–1.15
(–42.56)
–1.17
(–43.15)
–1.18
(–43.53)
Border Dummy 0.70
(5.04)
0.66
(4.73)
0.71
(5.11)
0.65
(4.72)
0.70
(5.03)
0.66
(4.72)
0.66
(4.72)
Language Dummy 0.12
(1.12)
0.20
(1.80)
0.26
(2.42)
0.21
(1.96)
0.28
(2.58)
0.24
(2.18)
0.21
(1.95)
Trade area Dummy 0.89
(10.50)
0.88
(10.27)
0.84
(9.79)
0.84
(9.82)
0.85
(9.89)
0.86
(10.04)
0.85
(9.95)
Religion Dummy 0.47
(8.77)
0.47
(8.70)
0.49
(9.04)
0.45
(8.40)
0.49
(9.15)
0.48
(8.89)
0.49
(9.06)
Colonial Dummy 0.69
(7.67)
0.65
(7.14)
0.53
(5.81)
0.55
(6.07)
0.56
(6.20)
0.56
(6.15)
0.55
(6.10)
Governance exporter 0.37
(10.45)
0.21
(4.69)
0.34
(7.70)
0.19
(4.34)
0.33
(7.60)
0.29
(7.43)
0.43
(8.30)
Governance importer 0.13
(3.86)
0.23
(5.43)
0.26
(5.87)
0.29
(7.19)
0.15
(3.53)
0.17
(4.28)
0.31
(6.11)
adj. R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
number of obs. 9 006 8 834 8 834 8 834 8 834 8715 8 715
F-statistic 1 515.69 1 469.26 1 479.88 1 473.76 1 473.92 1 473.45 1 481.48
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant 
terms are not shown in the table.
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Although differing between indicators and according to the country’s role as
exporter or importer, the impact of variation in the quality of institutions on
trade is substantial. An increase in regulatory quality of one standard deviation
from the mean leads to an estimated increase of 16–26% in trade7. Lower cor-
ruption, on average, accounts for 19–34% extra trade8. Using the composite in-
dicator of governance quality (last column), we gain insight in the overall trade
impact of variation in governance effectiveness9. Increasing the overall quality
of institutions one standard deviation above its mean level would raise bilateral
exports by 44%, and bilateral imports by 30%. These effects of governance on
trade intensity are substantial.
Apparently, trade costs associated with the effectiveness of institutions seri-
ously affect the distribution and size of bilateral trade flows. Yet, the introduc-
tion of institutional quality in the gravity equation does not substantially in-
crease the explained share of variation in trade flows, or noticeably affect the
coefficients on the bilateral variables and GDP. Omitted variable bias turns out
to be an essential element in interpreting the gravity model with institutions.
After institutions have been included in the gravity model, the clearly positive
effect of income per capita levels on trade disappears. The result is most pro-
nounced for the specification that uses the average index of institutional quality.
The effect of the level of development on trade becomes insignificant and neg-
ative for the import side, and even significantly negative for the export side.
This result confirms the findings in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), and
makes clear that the standard gravity model including income per capita as ex-
planatory variable suffers from severe omitted variable bias, if institutions are
not taken into account. Stated alternatively, institutional quality helps opening
up the black box that is created by the inclusion of GDP per capita.
On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that institutions are domi-
nant in explaining why rich countries trade more in general, and more so
amongst each other, while poor countries trade less amongst themselves.
Kaufmann et al. (2002, p. 4) already note the ‘strong positive association across
countries between governance and per capita incomes’. High-income countries
support high quality institutional systems that reduce transaction costs. Hence,
7. The mean score for regulatory quality is 0.18, with a standard deviation of 0.79. For an exporting
country (a semi-elasticity of 0.19), the average trade increase figure is computed as follows: 
d ln (Tij ) = 0.19 × 0.79 so  = (e 0.19×0.79 – 1) = 0.16 = 16%.
8. This confirms the finding by Tamirisa and Wei (2002) that corruption is an important informal
barrier to trade.
9. The average overall quality of governance in the sample is 0.16, with a standard deviation of
0.84.
dTij
Tij
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a possible solution for the missing theoretical explanation why rich countries
trade more has been found.
4.2 The effects of institutional homogeneity
Table 4 concentrates on gravity models extended with variables to reflect the
effect of institutional similarity. We focus on the composite indicator of govern-
ance quality, and discuss different models depending on the selection criteria
of classifying countries as similar in terms of institutional effectiveness. The
general qualitative pattern in the effect of similarity across various assumptions
is almost entirely replicated for the separate indicators individually (results are
available upon request).
In section II, we have explained how we constructed the dummy variable for
institutional similarity. If the absolute difference in institutional effectiveness
between the exporting and importing country does not exceed a specified frac-
tion of the sample standard deviation in the relevant index of governance, the
quality of governance is regarded as similar in both countries. The first three
columns present models in which we vary only the specified fraction. In the
first column, each difference below one standard deviation is associated with
institutional homogeneity. The other columns use 2 and 3 standard deviations
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 check for the importance of omitted country-
specific variables for the parameter estimates of similarity. They present mod-
els with a fully specified set of country-specific fixed effects, using similarity
dummies based on the one or two standard deviation criterions.
The effect of similarity in institutional effectiveness on trade appears to de-
pend on how inclusive the set of ‘similar’ countries is. With one standard devi-
ation as the criterion, 50% of the countries classify as homogeneous in terms
of governance effectiveness. The effect of similarity in this case is not signifi-
cant and appears to be negative. The effect is rather small: having a similar in-
stitutional framework appears to lower trade by 5%. If we relax the cut-off cri-
terion to two or three standard deviations, the fraction of ‘similar’ countries
increases first to 83% and then to 98%. In effect, this means that only countries
that differ very widely in terms of institutional quality are seen as dissimilar.
The trade effect of similarity becomes substantially positive and significant.
For a cut-off criterion of two standard deviations, similarity raises trade by an
estimated 13%.
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Table 4
Extended gravity equations: institutional homogeneity;
dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference
in institutional quality is:
< 1 standard 
deviation
< 2 standard 
deviations
< 3 standard 
deviations
< 1 standard 
deviationsa) 
< 2 standard 
deviationsa)
Log GDP exporter 1.18
(79.93)
1.18
(79.97)
1.18
(79.98)
Log GDP importer 0.85
(57.48)
0.85
(57.58)
0.85
(57.58)
Log GDP per capita 
exporter
0.20
(7.39)
0.21
(7.55)
0.21
(7.60)
Log GDP per capita 
importer
0.15
(5.71)
0.15
(5.66)
0.15
(5.58)
Log Distance –1.17
(–42.94)
–1.17
(–42.80)
–1.17
(–42.94)
–0.88
(–31.31)
–0.88
(–31.36)
Border Dummy 0.62
(4.43)
0.60
(4.28)
0.60
(4.33)
1.08
(8.44)
1.05
(8.24)
Language Dummy 0.19
(1.71)
0.19
(1.70)
0.18
(1.64)
0.59
(5.50)
0.58
(5.49)
Trade area Dummy 0.89
(10.27)
0.87
(10.04)
0.87
(10.12)
0.95
(10.52)
0.90
(9.94)
Religion Dummy 0.47
(8.61)
0.46
(8.54)
0.47
(8.64)
0.79
(15.27)
0.78
(14.96)
Colonial Dummy 0.64
(7.10)
0.64
(7.09)
0.65
(7.16)
0.62
(6.66)
0.61
(6.58)
Governance similarity –0.05
(–1.13)
0.12
(2.03)
0.49
(2.75)
–0.03
(–0.59)
0.27
(4.25)
adj. R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72
number of obs. 8 715 8 715 8 715 9 234 9 234
F-statistic 1 587.92 1 588.70 1 589.64 – –
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant 
terms, where applicable, are not shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.
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Table 5
Extended gravity equations: institutional quality and homogeneity;
dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference 
in institutional quality is:
< 1 standard
deviation
< 2 standard
deviations
< 3 standard
deviations
Log GDP exporter 1.19
(80.91)
1.20
(80.99)
1.19
(80.96)
Log GDP importer 0.86
(58.14)
0.86
(58.27)
0.86
(58.20)
Log GDP per capita exporter –0.09
(–2.04)
–0.10
(–2.15)
–0.09
(–2.04)
Log GDP per capita importer –0.05
(–1.26)
–0.06
(–1.31)
–0.05
(–1.16)
Log Distance –1.18
(–43.53)
–1.18
(–43.39)
–1.18
(–43.53)
Border Dummy 0.66
(4.76)
0.64
(4.61)
0.65
(4.69)
Language Dummy 0.21
(1.95)
0.21
(1.94)
0.21
(1.88)
Trade area Dummy 0.86
(9.97)
0.84
(9.74)
0.85
(9.87)
Religion Dummy 0.49
(9.08)
0.49
(9.02)
0.49
(9.11)
Colonial Dummy 0.55
(6.10)
0.55
(6.06)
0.56
(6.16)
Governance exporter 0.43
(8.25)
0.44
(8.48)
0.43
(8.36)
Governance importer 0.31
(6.11)
0.31
(6.11)
0.29
(5.87)
Governance similarity –0.03
(–0.66)
0.15
(2.69)
0.43
(2.46)
adj. R2 0.67 0.67 0.67
number of obs. 8715 8715 8715
F-statistic 1367.46 1369.06 1368.78
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant 
terms are not shown in the table.
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In Table 5, the specifications for different similarity definitions are estimated
when controlling for the level of institutional quality in both countries. Indeed,
institutional similarity and institutional quality have separate effects. Differ-
ences in institutional effectiveness affect trade, independently of the impact of
governance effectiveness itself. It appears that controlling for the level of qual-
ity corrects for an omitted variable bias on the effect of similarity as defined in
the first specification of Table 4. The effect of similarity in the specification us-
ing country dummies (column 4, Table 4) is very similar to the effect in the first
specification of Table 5. The negative effect of income per capita shows up
again after we have controlled for institutional quality as well (compare with
Table 4). Moreover, when accounting for the effect of institutional similarity,
the impact of institutional quality remains highly significant and positive.
To conclude, the impact of similarity on trade becomes substantially and sig-
nificantly positive if we classify sufficient countries as similar in terms of insti-
tutional effectiveness. Alternatively, differences in institutional quality only
start to have independent negative effects on trade, when the difference be-
comes really large. Then, unfamiliarity adds an extra dimension to the transac-
tion costs of bilateral trade. Adjustment costs, and additional lack of trust and
confidence in the security of transactions begin to accumulate when differences
in the institutional environment between exporters and importers increase.
When the impact of governance quality is taken into consideration, similarity
raises trade by an estimated 16% in the middle scenario of Table 5.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Recent research draws attention to the importance of informal barriers to inter-
national trade, caused by intangible factors. The institutional framework is an
important element in explaining the size of transaction costs. This paper has
therefore explicitly investigated the effect of institutions on the patterns of bi-
lateral trade. It starts from the argument that the quality of formal rules that
govern economic interaction is an important determinant of the uncertainty and
opportunism in market exchange. A low quality of governance increases the
transaction costs that are incurred in exchange. The impact of institutions on
private trade and investment is argued to be at least as important in international
exchange as in domestic transactions. Moreover, the quality of formal rules af-
fects the informal norms and procedures of doing business that are devised to
cope with transactional uncertainty. This creates the possibility that countries
with similar levels of institutional quality may be familiar with each others’
business practices. This reduces transaction costs.
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We find that institutional quality has a significant, positive and substantial
impact on bilateral trade flows. The same goes for similar quality of govern-
ance. These results support the hypothesis that institutional variation is an im-
portant determinant of informal barriers to trade. The positive correlation be-
tween income per capita and the quality of institutions gives rise to an
explanation of why high-income countries trade disproportionately amongst
each other, while the same does not hold for low-income countries. Generally
good governance lowers transaction costs for trade between high-income coun-
tries, while trade between low-income countries suffers from high insecurity
and transaction costs.
An important implication emerges from our separate focus on country-spe-
cific quality of institutions and bilateral homogeneity of governance. We show
that large divergence in the effectiveness of institutions independently reduces
trade. This reflects the adjustment costs and extra uncertainty involved when
traders do not share a sufficiently effective institutional framework. Institutional
dissimilarity affects trade between countries with the best institutional quality
and those that have the lowest effectiveness. Potential trade between these coun-
tries is diverted to partners closer in terms of institutional effectiveness. The im-
pact of trade diversion is likely to be most severe for low security countries.
Countries with poor formal institutions, apart from the negative effect of bad
governance on their mutual trade, somewhat bounce back into trade with similar
countries. Thus, they cannot benefit as much from trade with highly developed
countries, despite the potential comparative advantages, knowledge spillovers,
and large sales markets. These countries may become locked into a situation of
low economic performance. This provides an additional argument for serious
policy concern with the international promotion of good governance.
APPENDIX
A. Description of data
This appendix contains information on the data and variables used in the anal-
ysis. A description of the variables used in the analysis is presented, as well as
a description of their sources. Our data-set comprised the countries that have
been included in Kaufmann et al. (2002). In each estimated regression equa-
tion, we included those countries for which data on trade and the relevant re-
gressors were available or could be constructed.
For our analysis, we used data on bilateral trade for 1998 from the WITS da-
tabase, accessed on courtesy of the World Bank. The WITS includes various
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data-sets on trade. We have used UN data on aggregate exports between pairs
of countries. The figures focus on merchandise trade only. For information on
the level of GDP and GDP per capita, data from the World Development Indi-
cators (World Bank 2000, on CD Rom) were used for 1998. The data for insti-
tutional quality were taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (2002),
which we also used to construct figures for the bilateral variables reflecting in-
stitutional homogeneity. A further description of the institutional variables has
been included in the main text. We refer the reader to section 2 for this purpose.
The data on geographical distance, common border, common primary lan-
guage, common trade agreement, common dominant religion and common co-
lonial history have been collected from diverse sources, such as the data-set
used by Sala-i-Martin (1997), for religions and colonial backgrounds, and John
Haveman’s International Trade Data for distance, language and contiguity10.
This part of our database is available upon request from the corresponding au-
thor.
Many costs of trade are related to geographical distance, from physical
transport costs of goods and persons to the costs of cultural unfamiliarity. As
conventional in the literature, geographical distance has been measured as the
distance from home to foreign ‘as the bird flies’, using the principal city of each
country as its centre of gravity. This implies that the distance between the two
centres of gravity of neighbouring countries is likely to overestimate the aver-
age distance of trade between them. The argument that the distance measure
used leads to an overestimate of the distance of trade holds true for all pairs of
countries. However, its relative impact is much larger in neighbouring countries
than in countries that are far away from each other. Not all countries in our data-
set were represented in the database for bilateral distances. For these countries,
proxies were constructed using distances from neighbouring countries that
were included in the database. For more discussion of the use and usefulness of
other, more sophisticated measures of geographical distance, see Frankel
(1997, chapter 4). In general, more sophisticated measures do not change the
estimation results much, and cannot eliminate the measurement error for con-
tiguous countries either.
A common border dummy indicates whether two countries are adjacent.
Measurement error in the distance variable, as well as the effect of historical
relations between adjacent countries are captured by this dummy-variable. For
10. See http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm and http://www.macalester.edu/research/eco
nomics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Gravity, respectively. We grate-
fully acknowledge that these data have been made available electronically in such an accessible
way.
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countries in our data set that had no adjacency data available from the main
source, the CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook) was used to
determine whether they shared borders with any other country in the data-set.
To assess commonality in primary language, we used a database that dis-
tinguished fourteen languages: Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English,
French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and
Swedish. In case none of these applied or no data were available, the categories
‘other language’ and ‘non available’ were assigned. Using the CIA factbook,
these countries have been checked. A dummy variable reflects whether or not
two countries have the same primary language, an important aspect of cultural
similarity.
Whether pairs of countries take part in common trade agreements has been
assessed using WTO data on major regional integration agreements. A dummy
variable (common trade bloc) indicates whether a pair of countries enters into
at least one common regional Preferential Trade Agreement.
Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a com-
mon dominant religion or a shared colonial past. Data for religion and colonial
background have been taken from Sala-i-Martin (1997). Percentages of the
population that adhere to one of seven major religions are presented. These re-
ligions are: Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jewish religion,
Islam, and Protestantism. For some countries, two religions were equally dom-
inant over the others. These countries entered into the analysis with both reli-
gions as dominant religion. Commonality of dominant religion implies a value
of 1 for the dummy variable ‘common religion’.
The dummy variable ‘common colony’ reflects for each pair of countries
whether both of them share a similar colonial history. The data considered the
British, French and Spanish empires only. We also included the colonizers
themselves into the respective empires, contrary to the original source. In this
way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs of countries.
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SUMMARY
This paper studies the effect of institutions on trade flows, using a gravity model approach. Standard
gravity equations incorporate factors such as geographical proximity, language, trade policy and
common history as explanatory factors for variation in bilateral trade that reflect the costs of trade
across geographical and cultural distance. We extend this type of analysis by focusing on the rele-
vance of the quality of governance and the extent of familiarity with the resulting framework of rules
and norms in explaining variation in bilateral trade patterns. More specifically, we test whether insti-
tutional homogeneity and institutional quality have an independent impact on the trade volume be-
tween pairs of countries. We find that having a similar institutional framework promotes bilateral
trade by 13%, on average. Furthermore, a better quality of formal institutions tends to coincide with
more trade. Depending on being either importer or exporter, an increase in overall institutional qual-
ity of one standard deviation from the mean leads to an estimated increase of 30–44% in bilateral
trade.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Dieser Artikel untersucht anhand eines Gravitationsmodells die Auswirkungen von Institutionen auf
Handelsströme. Gravitationsgleichungen beinhalten standardmässig Faktoren wie geographische
Entfernung, Sprache, Handelspolitik und gemeinsame Geschichte als Erklärung für Veränderungen
im bilateralen Handel, die die Kosten des Handels über geographische und kulturelle Grenzen hin-
weg anzeigen. Wir weiten diese Analyse aus und konzentrieren uns auf die Relevanz der Qualität der
Regierung und das Ausmass der Vertrautheit mit dem bestehenden Regelwerk, um Variationen in bi-
lateralen Handelsmustern zu erklären. Insbesondere testen wir, ob institutionelle Homogenität und
Qualität unabhängig voneinander das Handelsvolumen zwischen zwei Ländern beeinflussen. Wir fin-
den, dass der bilaterale Handel unter ähnlichen institutionellen Bedingungen durchschnittlich um
13% steigt. Ausserdem fallen qualitativ bessere Institutionen tendenziell mit mehr Handel zusam-
men. Für Importeure bzw. Exporteure führt eine Steigerung der gesamten institutionellen Qualität
um eine Standardabweichung zu einer geschätzten Zunahme des Handelsvolumens um 30 bis 44%.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article étudie les effets des institutions sur les flux de commerce en se servant d’un modèle de
gravité. Les équations de gravité standard comprennent des facteurs comme la distance
géographique, la langue, la politique du commerce et une histoire commune pour expliquer les va-
riations dans le commerce bilatéral qui sont une image des coûts du commerce sur une distance
géographique et culturelle. Nous étendons ce genre d’analyse en nous concentrant sur la signification
de la qualité du gouvernement et la connaissance approfondie des conditions de base des règles et
des normes pour expliquer les variations dans le commerce bilatéral. En particulier, nous testons si
l’homogénéité et la qualité institutionnelles ont un impact indépendamment l’une de l’autre sur le
volume de commerce entre deux pays. Nous trouvons que le fait d’avoir un cadre institutionnel sem-
blable augmente le commerce bilatéral d’environ 13% en moyenne. En outre, une meilleure qualité
des institutions formelles a tendance à coïncider avec un commerce accru. Pour les importateurs et
les exportateurs, respectivement, une hausse d’une déviation standard de la qualité générale des ins-
titutions engendre une hausse estimée du commerce bilatéral d’environ 30 à 44%.
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